ESG and Managerial Agency Problems

Managerial Overconfidence , Agency Problems , Financing Decisions and Firm Performance

Consumers and Agency Problems*

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Managerial Flexibility, Agency Costs and Optimal Capital Structure

This paper investigates the effect of managerial flexibility on the choice of capital structure for a firm and the corresponding valuation of its long term debt. We consider a general model in continuous time where the manager (who is not a shareholder) of a firm with long term debt in place may dynamically switch strategies at random times so as to maximize his expected discounted compensation...

Optimal Managerial Tenure in Dynamic Agency with Renegotiation

This paper examines the impact of repeated renegotiation on incentives and managerial tenure when performance information is serially correlated. In addition to providing a general solution to a multi-period agency problem with serially correlated performance measures, the paper characterizes optimal managerial tenure/turnover policies as a function of the time-series properties of performance ...

An Agency Theory of the Division of Managerial Labor

Should responsibility for strategic planning and execution be assigned to the same manager? Should a firm have a chief operating officer with responsibilities distinct from those of the chief executive officer? How does the division of labor affect managerial opportunism? This paper uses a formal agency-theoretic model to address these questions and present a new theory of the division of manag...