Escalating penalties for repeat offenders
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Escalating Penalties – An Infinite Game - Approach
The paper provides an economic rationale for punishing repeat offenders with increasing sanctions. We analyse the optimal intertemporal punishment scheme within an infinite game framework. The legal authority is assumed to minimize the social cost of punishment under the constraint of keeping delinquency at a maximal tolerable level. This level is exogenously determined. JEL classification: K14
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First we show that for wealth-constrained agents who may commit an act twice the optimal sanctions are the offender’s entire wealth for the first and zero for the second crime. Then we ask the question whether this decreasing sanction scheme is subgame perfect (time consistent), i.e., does a rent-seeking government stick to this sanction scheme after the first crime has occurred. If the benefit...
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This paper concludes that, when offenders are wealth constrained and the government is resource constrained and can commit to a certain policy throughout the whole planning horizon, cost minimizing deterrence is decreasing, rather than increasing, in the number of offenses. By extending the framework, suggested in Emons (2003), to n-periods setting, we prove that for the agents who may commit a...
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BACKGROUND Mopeds have less stringent licensing laws than automobiles. Moped operators in motorized vehicle collisions (MVCs) exhibit significantly higher rates of driving while intoxicated (DWI) and higher blood alcohol levels than automobile or motorcycle operators. This study evaluates the public safety issue of DWI recidivism among moped operators. METHODS Moped operators evaluated after ...
متن کاملA Note on the Optimal Punishment for Repeat Offenders
Agents may commit a crime twice. The act is inefficient so that the agents are to be deterred. The agents are wealth constrained so that increasing the fine for the first offense means a reduction in the sanction for the second offense and vice versa. The agents may follow history dependent strategies. The government seeks to minimize the probability of apprehension. The optimal sanction scheme...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Review of Law and Economics
سال: 2007
ISSN: 0144-8188
DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2007.06.005