Ergodic Transition in a Simple Model of the Continuous Double Auction

Ergodic Transition in a Simple Model of the Continuous Double Auction

We study a phenomenological model for the continuous double auction, whose aggregate order process is equivalent to two independent M/M/1 queues. The continuous double auction defines a continuous-time random walk for trade prices. The conditions for ergodicity of the auction are derived and, as a consequence, three possible regimes in the behavior of prices and logarithmic returns are observed...

A Comparative Study of Multi-Attribute Continuous Double Auction Mechanisms

Auctions have been as a competitive method of buying and selling valuable or rare items for a long time. Single-sided auctions in which participants negotiate on a single attribute (e.g. price) are very popular. Double auctions and negotiation on multiple attributes create more advantages compared to single-sided and single-attribute auctions. Nonetheless, this adds the complexity of the auctio...

a comparative study of multi-attribute continuous double auction mechanisms

auctions have been as a competitive method of buying and selling valuable or rare items for a long time. single-sided auctions in which participants negotiate on a single attribute (e.g. price) are very popular. double auctions and negotiation on multiple attributes create more advantages compared to single-sided and single-attribute auctions. nonetheless, this adds the complexity of the auctio...

A simple testable model of double auction markets

We propose a model of price formation in Double Auction markets which employs the strong simplifying assumption that agents neglect strategic feedback effects and regard themselves as playing a Game against Nature. Agents otherwise are strict expected utihty maximizers employing Bayesian updating procedures. We prove the optimality of simple (‘aggressive reservation price’) strategies in our ge...

Probabilistic properties of the continuous double auction