Equilibrium with mutual organizations in adverse selection economies
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Efficient Equilibria in Economies with Adverse Selection
In economies with Adverse Selection the existing Competitive Equilibrium concept ([10]) imply either that the equilibrium does not exist, or that it is not necessarily efficient. We introduce and analyze, within the Rotschild and Stiglitz model of Adverse Selection, a competitive notion of equilibrium, a constrained competitive equilibrium, which yields a unique and constrained efficient alloca...
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در این تحقیق به مطالعه وجود انتخاب نامساعد(کژ گزینی) در بازار بیمه درمان تکمیلی ایران پرداخته شده است. داده های مورد نیاز توسط پرسشنامه و به روش نمونه گیری خوشه ای جمع آوری شده است. پرسشنامه ها در میان افراد شاغل ساکن شهر تهران توریع شد. در این تحقیق با استفاده از تخمین دو مدل لجستیک و به دست آوردن ضریب همبستگی میان تقاضای بیمه درمان تکمیلی و رخداد خسارت به بررسی موضوع مورد نظر پرداخته شده است....
15 صفحه اولOnline Appendix for Behavioral Equilibrium in Economies with Adverse Selection A. A Class of Games with Monotone Selection
This section presents a setup that arises frequently in adverse selection settings and provides conditions on the primitives such that the properties that de ne a game with monotone selection are satis ed. The following de nitions and results (in addition to those in the print appendix) are used: A correspondence : T ! X is increasing in the strong set order if when t > t0, then for each x 2 (t...
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In insurance economies with a continuum of agents and adverse selection, it is shown that incentive-constrained Pareto efficient allocations correspond to regulated competitive (or compensated competitive) equilibria in markets with non-linear pricing for options to buy insurance contracts. These options make the incentive constraints self-enforcing. Efficiency is achieved through a “universal ...
متن کاملIncentive Efficient Price Systems in Economies with Adverse Selection∗
We decentralize incentive efficient allocations in large adverse selection economies by introducing a Walrasian market for mechanisms, that is, for menus of contracts. Facing a budget constraint, informed individuals choose lotteries over mechanisms, while firms supply (slots at) mechanisms at given prices. An equilibrium requires that firms cannot favorably change, or cut, prices. We show that...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economic Theory
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0938-2259,1432-0479
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-015-0918-3