Equilibrium uniqueness with perfect complements
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Equilibrium uniqueness with perfect complements
It is sometimes the case that some economic goods are perfect complements to some agents, but not to all agents. As an illustration, consider the following highly stylized story. A regulator faces the problem of pricing the use of a given network, e.g., a highway network. For our purposes, a network is simply a graph, with no loop. Each edge of the graph has a capacity: the maximal amount of tr...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economic Theory
سال: 2006
ISSN: 0938-2259,1432-0479
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-005-0645-2