Equilibrium Strategy and Population-Size Effects in Lowest Unique Bid Auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Equilibrium strategy and population-size effects in lowest unique bid auctions.
In lowest unique bid auctions, N players bid for an item. The winner is whoever places the lowest bid, provided that it is also unique. We use a grand canonical approach to derive an analytical expression for the equilibrium distribution of strategies. We then study the properties of the solution as a function of the mean number of players, and compare them with a large data set of internet auc...
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The recent online platforms propose multiple items for bidding. The state of the art, however, is limited to the analysis of one item auction without resubmission. In this paper we study multi-item lowest unique bid auctions (LUBA) with resubmission in discrete bid spaces under budget constraints. We show that the game does not have pure Bayes-Nash equilibria (except in very special cases). How...
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In lowest unique bid auctions, N players bid for an item. The winner is whoever places the lowest bid, provided that it is also unique. We derive an analytical expression for the equilibrium distribution of the game as a function of N and study its properties, which are then compared with a large dataset of internet auctions. The empirical collective strategy reproduces the theoretical equilibr...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Physical Review Letters
سال: 2012
ISSN: 0031-9007,1079-7114
DOI: 10.1103/physrevlett.108.088701