Equilibrium Selection in Evolutionary Games with Imperfect Monitoring
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Equilibrium Selection in Evolutionary Games with Imperfect Monitoring
In this paper we analyze players’ long-run behavior in evolutionary coordination games with imperfect monitoring in a large population. Players can observe signals corresponding to other players’ unseen actions and use the proposed simple or maximum likelihood estimation algorithm to extract information from the signals. In the simple learning process we find conditions for the risk-dominant an...
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We characterize the set of communication equilibrium payoffs of any undiscounted repeated matrix-game with imperfect monitoring and complete information. For two-player games, a characterization is provided by Mertens, Sorin, and Zamir (Repeated games, Part A (1994) CORE DP 9420), mainly using Lehrer’s (Math. Operations Res. (1992) 175) result for correlated equilibria. The main result of this ...
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Efficient Learning Equilibrium (ELE) is a natural solution concept for multi-agent encounters with incomplete information. It requires the learning algorithms themselves to be in equilibrium for any game selected from a set of (initially unknown) games. In an optimal ELE, the learning algorithms would efficiently obtain the surplus the agents would obtain in an optimal Nash equilibrium of the i...
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We discuss stochastic dynamics of populations of individuals playing games. Our models possess two evolutionarily stable strategies: an efficient one, where a population is in a state with the maximal payoff (fitness) and a risk-dominant one, where players are averse to risks. We assume that individuals play with randomly chosen opponents (they do not play against average strategies as in the s...
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This chapter provides an introductory exposition of stochastic games with imperfect monitoring. These are stochastic games in which the players imperfectly observe the play. We discuss at length a few basic issues, and describe selected contributions. Our objective in this chapter is to provide an introductory exposition of some recent work on zero-sum stochastic games with imperfect monitoring...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Applied Probability
سال: 2008
ISSN: 0021-9002,1475-6072
DOI: 10.1239/jap/1214950355