Equilibrium Selection in Auctions and High Stakes Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Equilibrium Selection in Auctions and High Stakes Games∗
We introduce the test-set equilibrium refinement of Nash equilibrium and apply it to three well-known auction games, comparing our findings to similar ones previously obtained by ad hoc equilibrium selections. We also introduce a theory of high stakes versions of games, in which strategies are first proposed and then subjected to a potentially costly review-and-revise process. For finite games,...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Econometrica
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0012-9682
DOI: 10.3982/ecta12536