Equilibrium selection in a nonlinear duopoly game with adaptive expectations
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Equilibrium selection in a nonlinear duopoly game with adaptive expectations
We analyze a nonlinear discrete time Cournot duopoly game, where players have adaptive expectations. The evolution of expected outputs over time is generated by the iteration of a noninvertible two-dimensional map. The long-run behavior is characterized by multistability, that is, the presence of coexisting stable consistent beliefs, which correspond to Nash equilibria in the quantity space. He...
متن کاملEquilibrium stability of a nonlinear heterogeneous duopoly game with extrapolative foresight
We make a further attempt to investigate equilibrium stability of a nonlinear Cournot duopoly game with adaptive adjustment toward best reply by assuming heterogeneous firms where one firm only uses naive expectations whereas the other employs a simple forecast technology to form sophisticated expectations. More precisely, based on the knowledge of actual production of the competitor and its ac...
متن کاملNonlinear dynamics in the Cournot duopoly game with heterogeneous players
We analyze a nonlinear discrete-time Cournot duopoly game, where players have heterogeneous expectations. Two types of players are considered: boundedly rational and naive expectations. In this study we show that the dynamics of the duopoly game with players whose beliefs are heterogeneous, may become complicated. The model gives more complex chaotic and unpredictable trajectories as a conseque...
متن کاملAnalytic Solutions of Nonlinear Cournot Duopoly Game
The main aim of this study is to construct an explicit form of an analytic solution of a multidimensional difference equation. To this end, we present a nonlinear Cournot duopoly model with unimodal reaction functions, show that its dynamical system is double logistic when the production externalities involved get stronger, and then give a constructive proof of the existence of an analytic solu...
متن کاملRobustness of Adaptive Expectations as an Equilibrium Selection Device – Supplementary
These are supplementary notes for Van Zandt and Lettau (2003). They include proofs of certain details in the main paper, and a few extensions. To be in synch, these notes and the main paper should have the same date.
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
سال: 2001
ISSN: 0167-2681
DOI: 10.1016/s0167-2681(01)00188-3