Equilibrium Resolution Mechanism for Multidimensional Conflicts in Farmland Expropriation Based on a Multistage Van Damme’s Model

Multidimensional conflicts in farmland expropriation originate from the game of multidimensional interests between local government and farmers. The strategy choices equilibrium results two sides have evolved with changes to situation policy adjustments. Focusing on different types conflicts, this paper constructs a multistage Van Damme’s model expropriation, analyzes stable point behavior evolution farmers under litigation settlement nonlitigation settlement, conducts simulation analysis conflict resolution both at stages through MATLAB numerical simulation. show that (1) interests’ has changed periodically due system; (2) there is only “government rent-seeking” conflict: order resolve conflict, cost for can be reduced, while other interventions, such as controlling rent-seeking ceiling increasing costs government, implemented; (3) are three conflicts: we should control increase or its positive social externality benefits reasonable expropriation; “nail household dilemma” their compensation; “extreme controversy” one hand, farmers, farmers’ compensation negative losses rent seeking.