Equilibrium points of random generalized games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Equilibrium Points in N - Person Games
* This note arose from consultations during the tenure of a John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Fellowship by MacLane. ' Whitehead, J. H. C., "Combinatorial Homotopy I and II," Bull. A.M.S., 55, 214-245 and 453-496 (1949). We refer to these papers as CH I and CH II, respectively. ' By a complex we shall mean a connected CW complex, as defined in §5 of CH I. We do not restrict ourselres to finite com...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Mathematics and Mathematical Sciences
سال: 1998
ISSN: 0161-1712,1687-0425
DOI: 10.1155/s0161171298001100