منابع مشابه
Equilibrium Points in N - Person Games
* This note arose from consultations during the tenure of a John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Fellowship by MacLane. ' Whitehead, J. H. C., "Combinatorial Homotopy I and II," Bull. A.M.S., 55, 214-245 and 453-496 (1949). We refer to these papers as CH I and CH II, respectively. ' By a complex we shall mean a connected CW complex, as defined in §5 of CH I. We do not restrict ourselres to finite com...
متن کاملEquilibrium Points in N-Person Games.
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Abstract This paper provides a closed-form optimal solution to the multi-objective model of the fair allocation of gains obtained by cooperation among all players. The optimality of the proposed solution is first proved. Then, the properties of the proposed solution are investigated. At the end, a numerical example in inventory control environment is given to demonstrate the application and t...
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The heart of the equilibrium selection theory of Harsanyi and Selten (1988, A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press) is given by the tracing procedure, a mathematical construction that adjusts arbitrary prior beliefs into equilibrium beliefs. Although the term “procedure” suggests a numerical approach, the tracing procedure itself is a nonconstructive method...
متن کاملEquilibrium Cooperation in Three-Person, Choice-of-Partner Games
The experiment involves three-person games in which one player can choose which of two others to "do business with." The ability of the chooser to switch away from a defecting partner in a subsequent stage constitutes a salient action that may be used to punish static, noncooperative play. In this manner, cooperative outcomes that are not Nash equilibria in stage games can be supported by nonco...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
سال: 1950
ISSN: 0027-8424,1091-6490
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.36.1.48