Equilibrium Inefficiency and Computation in Cost-Sharing Games in Real-Time Scheduling Systems

Smooth Inequalities and Equilibrium Inefficiency in Scheduling Games

We study coordination mechanisms for Scheduling Games (with unrelated machines). In these games, each job represents a player, who needs to choose a machine for its execution, and intends to complete earliest possible. In an egalitarian objective, the social cost would be the maximal job completion time, i.e. the makespan of the schedule. In an utilitarian objective, the social cost would be th...

Equilibrium in risk-sharing games

Pseudonyms in Cost-Sharing Games

This work initiates the study of cost-sharing mechanisms that, in addition to the usual incentive compatibility conditions, make it disadvantageous for the users to employ pseudonyms. We show that this is possible only if all serviced users pay the same price, which implies that such mechanisms do not exist even for certain subadditive cost functions. In practice, a user can increase her utilit...

Scheduling and Synchronization in Real Time Systems

Real time computing is a wide open research area of intellectually challenging computer science problems with direct payoos to current technology. Real time systems have brought in huge challenges in a wide range of computer science disciplines, and each of those challenges must be met before the science of large scale real time systems can become a reality. This paper provides an overview of s...

Quantifying Inefficiency of Fair Cost-Sharing Mechanisms for Sharing Economy

Sharing economy, a distributed peer-to-peer eco-nomic paradigm, gives rise to a variety of social interactionsfor economic reasons. One common distributed decision-makingprocess is the coalition formation to share certain replaceable re-sources collaboratively, for example, sharing hotel rooms amongtravelers, sharing taxi-rides among passengers, and sharingregular passes...