Equilibrium in Evolutionary Games: Some Experimental Results
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Equilibrium in Evolutionary Games: Some Experimental Results
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Economic Journal
سال: 1996
ISSN: 0013-0133
DOI: 10.2307/2234928