EQUILIBRIUM, EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY AND GRADIENT DYNAMICS
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Equilibrium, Evolutionary stability and Gradient Dynamics
Considered here are equilibria, notably those that solve noncooperative games. Focus is on connections between evolutionary stability, concavity and monotonicity. It is shown that evolutionary stable points are local attractors under gradient dynamics. Such dynamics, while reflecting search for individual improvement, can incorporate myopia, imperfect knowledge and bounded rationality/competence.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Game Theory Review
سال: 2002
ISSN: 0219-1989,1793-6675
DOI: 10.1142/s0219198902000756