Equilibrium Delay and Nonexistence of Equilibrium in Unanimity Bargaining Games

Equilibrium Behavior in Crisis Bargaining Games

Bargaining, Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with Contracts1

Consider a two-person intertemporal bargaining problem in which players choose actions and o¤ers each period and collect payo¤s (as function of that period’s actions) while bargaining proceeds. This can alternatively be viewed as an in…nitely-repeated game wherein players can o¤er one another enforceable contracts that govern play for the rest of the game. Theory is silent regarding how the sur...

Bargaining, Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games

By arriving at self-enforcing agreements, agents in an ongoing strategic situation create surplus that benefits them both. Little is known about how that surplus will be divided. This project concerns the role of reputation formation in such environments. It studies a model in which players entertain the slight possibility that their opponents may be one of a variety of behavioral types. When p...

Competitive bargaining equilibrium

We propose a simple bargaining procedure, the equilibrium of which converges to the Walrasian allocation as the agents become increasingly patient. We thus establish that the competitive outcome obtains even if agents have market power and are not price-takers. Moreover, where in other bargaining protocols the final outcome depends on bargaining power or relative impatience, the outcome here is...

Multilateral bargaining and Walrasian equilibrium

A class of bargaining games in which agents bargain over prices and maximum trading constraints is considered: It is proved that all the Stationary Subgame Perfect Equilibria of these games implement Walrasian allocations as the bargaining frictions vanish. The result holds for any number of agents and is robust to different specifications of the bargaining process. © 2011 Published by Elsevier...