Equilibrium Concepts for Social Interaction Models
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Equilibrium Concepts for Social Interaction Models
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هدف اصلی از این تحقیق به دست آوردن و مقایسه حق بیمه باورمندی در مدل های شمارشی گزارش نشده برای داده های طولی می باشد. در این تحقیق حق بیمه های پبش گویی بر اساس توابع ضرر مربع خطا و نمایی محاسبه شده و با هم مقایسه می شود. تمایل به گرفتن پاداش و جایزه یکی از دلایل مهم برای گزارش ندادن تصادفات می باشد و افراد برای استفاده از تخفیف اغلب از گزارش تصادفات با هزینه پائین خودداری می کنند، در این تحقیق ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Game Theory Review
سال: 2003
ISSN: 0219-1989,1793-6675
DOI: 10.1142/s021919890300101x