Equilibrium competition, social welfare and corruption in procurement auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Corruption and competition in procurement auctions
We investigate the effect of corruption on competition in procurement. Our assumption is that the bureaucrat (i.e., the agent that administers the market), if corrupt, may provide an opportunity for bid readjusments in exchange for a bribe. As firms expect to be paying a bribe, a mechanical effect of corruption is to increase the contract price by an amount corresponding to the anticipated brib...
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This paper investigates the effect of corruption on competition in government procurement auctions. Our assumption is that the bureaucrat (i.e. the agent that administers the market), if corrupt, may provide a favor in exchange for a bribe. The favor we consider in most of our analysis is the opportunity to readjust a bid. We show that a key effect of corruption is to facilitate collusion in pr...
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In this study, we conduct a competitive equilibrium analysis for the repeated (sequential) procurement auctions. We consider capacitated suppliers (bidders), each with a U-shaped cost function that captures the economies (and dis-economies) of scale in bidding quantity. Cases with both homogenous and non-homogenous bidders are considered in a symmetric incomplete information setting. First we a...
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Quasi‐linearity of preferences is one of the standard assumptions in auction theory. This assumption is of particular significance in multi‐attribute reverse auctions which are used in procurement. This paper presents an analysis of this assumption and its implications. Building on observations of scholars in economics and decision sciences who note that in practice such preferences may be rare...
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We study the effects of the recent economic crisis on firms׳ bidding behavior and markups in sealed bid auctions. Using data from Austrian construction procurements, we estimate bidders׳ construction costs within a private value auction model. We find that markups of all bids submitted decrease by 1.5 percentage points in the recent economic crisis, markups of winning bids decrease by 3.3 perce...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Choice and Welfare
سال: 2019
ISSN: 0176-1714,1432-217X
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-019-01192-8