Equilibrium Bids in Sponsored Search Auctions: Theory and Evidence
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Equilibrium Bids in Sponsored Search Auctions: Theory and Evidence∗
This paper presents a game theoretic analysis of the generalized second price auction that Yahoo operates to sell sponsored search listings on its search engine. We present results that indicate that this auction has a multiplicity of Nash equilibria. We also show that weak dominance arguments do not in general select a unique Nash equilibrium. We then analyze bid data assuming that advertisers...
متن کاملEquilibrium Bids in Sponsored Search Auctions: Theory and Evidence Article (accepted Version) (refereed) Equilibrium Bids in Sponsored Search Auctions: Theory and Evidence *
This paper presents a game theoretic analysis of the generalized second price auction that the company Overture operated in 2004 to sell sponsored search listings on search engines. We construct a model that embodies few prior assumptions about parameters, and we present results that indicate that this model has under quite general assumptions a multiplicity of Nash equilibria. We then analyze ...
متن کاملCommon Agency and Coordinated Bids in Sponsored Search Auctions
The transition of the advertisement market from traditional media to the internet has induced a proliferation of marketing agencies specialized in bidding in the auctions used to sell advertisement space on the web. We analyze how bidding delegation to a common marketing agency undermines both revenues and efficiency of the generalized second price auction, the format used by Google and Microso...
متن کاملEquilibrium Efficiency and Price Complexity in Sponsored Search Auctions
Modern sponsored search auctions are derived from the Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction. Although the GSP auction is not truthful, results by Edelman, Ostrovsky, and Schwarz [7] and Varian [13] give senses in which its outcome is equivalent to that of the truthful and welfaremaximizing VCG mechanism. The first main message of this paper is that these properties are not unique to the GSP au...
متن کاملOptimal Auction Design and Equilibrium Selection in Sponsored Search Auctions
In analyses of sponsored search auctions for online advertising, it is customary to model the dynamic game of incomplete information by considering a static games of complete information. This approach is used in Edelman, Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2007) (EOS), Varian (2007), and the subsequent literature. Modeling complex interactions in uncertain environments as games of complete information has ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
سال: 2013
ISSN: 1945-7669,1945-7685
DOI: 10.1257/mic.5.4.163