Equilibria of non-compact generalized games with l∗-majorized preference correspondences
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Of Generalized Games with L - Majorized
In this paper, we shall prove three equilibrium existence theorems for generalized games in Hausdorff topological vector spaces.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications
سال: 1992
ISSN: 0022-247X
DOI: 10.1016/0022-247x(92)90130-6