Equilibria for two parallel links: the strong price of anarchy versus the price of anarchy
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Price of Anarchy for Restricted Parallel Links
In the model of restricted parallel links, n users must be routed on m parallel links under the restriction that the link for each user be chosen from a certain set of allowed links for the user. In a (pure) Nash equilibrium, no user may improve its own Individual Cost (latency) by unilaterally switching to another link from its set of allowed links. The Price of Anarchy is a widely adopted mea...
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Interstate 5 stretches through California’s San Joaquin valley, straight and flat as far as the eye can see, giving drivers a unique opportunity to observe game theory in action. With only two lanes in each direction, most cars stay in the left lane, zipping past the slow moving trucks, which keep to the right. Every so often, an impatient truck driver lumbers into the left lane, blockading the...
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We introduce a framework for studying the effect of cooperation on the quality of outcomes in utility games. Our framework is a coalitional analog of the smoothness framework of noncooperative games. Coalitional smoothness implies bounds on the strong price of anarchy, the loss of quality of coalitionally stable outcomes, as well as bounds on coalitional versions of coarse correlated equilibria...
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Internet users, auction bidders, and stock buyers are examples of agents who are selfishly trying to maximize their own benefit without necessarily caring the global objective of the underlying game such as the overall load on the network or the overall satisfaction of agents. How does these two points of view (agents vs. global) correlate? How much does the society suffer by the lack of coordi...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Acta Informatica
سال: 2010
ISSN: 0001-5903,1432-0525
DOI: 10.1007/s00236-010-0124-5