Equilibria and approximate equilibria in infinite potential games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Computing Constrained Approximate Equilibria in Polymatrix Games
This paper is about computing constrained approximate Nash equilibria in polymatrix games, which are succinctly represented manyplayer games defined by an interaction graph between the players. In a recent breakthrough, Rubinstein showed that there exists a small constant ǫ, such that it is PPAD-complete to find an (unconstrained) ǫ-Nash equilibrium of a polymatrix game. In the first part of th...
متن کاملApproximate Equilibria in Games with Few Players
We study the problem of computing approximate Nash equilibria (ǫ-Nash equilibria) in normal form games, where the number of players is a small constant. We consider the approach of looking for solutions with constant support size. It is known from recent work that in the 2-player case, a 1 2 -Nash equilibrium can be easily found, but in general one cannot achieve a smaller value of ǫ than 1 2 ....
متن کاملSearching for Approximate Equilibria in Empirical Games
When exploring a game over a large strategy space, it may not be feasible or cost-effective to evaluate the payoff of every relevant strategy profile. For example, determining a profile payoff for a procedurally defined game may require Monte Carlo simulation or other costly computation. Analyzing such games poses a search problem, with the goal of identifying equilibrium profiles by evaluating...
متن کاملApproximate Nash equilibria in anonymous games
We study from an algorithmic viewpoint anonymous games [Mil96, Blo99, Blo05, Kal05]. In these games a large population of players shares the same strategy set and, while players may have different payoff functions, the payoff of each depends on her own choice of strategy and the number of the other players playing each strategy (not the identity of these players). We show that, the intractabili...
متن کاملSearching for approximate equilibria in empirical games
When exploring a game over a large strategy space, it may not be feasible or cost-effective to evaluate the payoff of every relevant strategy profile. For example, determining a profile payoff for a procedurally defined game may require Monte Carlo simulation or other costly computation. Analyzing such games poses a search problem, with the goal of identifying equilibrium profiles by evaluating...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economics Letters
سال: 1997
ISSN: 0165-1765
DOI: 10.1016/s0165-1765(97)81895-2