Epsilon Cores of Games with Limited Side Payments: Nonemptiness and Equal Treatment
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Epsilon Cores of Games with Limited Side Payments: Nonemptiness and Equal Treatment
We introduce the concept of a parameterized collection of games with limited side payments, ruling out large transfers of utility. Under the assumption that the payoff set of the grand coalition is convex, we show that a game ∗This paper revises Autonomous University of Barcelona Working Paper number WP 392.97 and Warwick University Department of Economics Working Paper No 536. The authors are ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2001
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1006/game.2000.0815