Epistemic Responsibility and Criminal Negligence
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Epistemic Responsibility without Epistemic Agency
This article discusses the arguments against associating epistemic responsibility with the ordinary notion of agency. I examine the various “Kantian” views which lead to a distinctive conception of epistemic agency and epistemic responsibility, in particular the one proposed by Pamela Hieronymi (2007). I try to explain why we can be held responsible for our beliefs in the sense of obeying norms...
متن کاملCriminal Responsibility
are not always evident to the man in the street and are particularly easy to neglect when involved in the highly sensational atmosphere of a murder trial; this is of course particularly so if the details are horrific or sexual or both and if a plea of insanity is raised in defence. It may therefore be helpful to re-state the points at issue. The first point is that lawyers and doctors talk in d...
متن کاملCriminal Responsibility
the definition of a crime has never yet been clearly made. A crime has been described as a result of human conduct, which it is the policy of the governing power in the state to prevent. Usually it is followed by a punishment , but this was not always so. In early years, suffering was imposed on the wrongdoer, and in Roman times expiation was necessary to placate the offended gods. That which d...
متن کاملAmnesia and criminal responsibility
INTRODUCTION Under common law, criminal responsibility usually distinguishes between intentional act and accident, andmost serious criminal offenses consist of both a voluntary act and a guilty mind.1 This treatment presumes that no defendant should be held criminally responsible without a finding of fault. Despite this long-standing conceptual commitment to fairness, criminal law continues to ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Criminal Law and Philosophy
سال: 2019
ISSN: 1871-9791,1871-9805
DOI: 10.1007/s11572-019-09507-7