Epistemic Libertarian Paternalism

Abstract Libertarian paternalism is a weak form of that recommends nudges rather than bans, restrictions, or other strong interventions. Nudges influence people’s choice by modifying contextual factors (the “choice architecture”). This paper explores the possibility an epistemic analogue libertarian paternalism. What I call “epistemic libertarian paternalism” “epistemic nudges” stronger paternalistic Epistemic beliefs and judgments The main aim this to defend epistemic paternalism from “irrationality problem”, which take be most urgent problem for paternalism; given how work (i.e. they typically co-opt psychological biases), nudged are irrational. In response irrationality problem, admit often (not always, though) irrational, but insist there conditions in nudging can justifiable nonetheless. will propose two jointly sufficient nudging: “Veridicality Condition” (which says more likely true non-nudged beliefs) “Not-More-Irrationality not irrational beliefs).