Epistemic Invariantism and Speech Act Contextualism
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Epistemic Invariantism and Speech Act Contextualism
This paper shows how to reconcile epistemic invariantism with the knowledge account of assertion. My basic proposal is that we can comfortably combine invariantism with the knowledge account of assertion by endorsing contextualism about speech acts. My demonstration takes place against the backdrop of recent contextualist attempts to usurp the knowledge account of assertion, most notably Keith ...
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§I schematises the evidence for an understanding of ‘know’ and other terms of epistemic appraisal that embodies contextualism or subject-sensitive invariantism, and distinguishes between those two approaches. §II argues that although the cases for contextualism and sensitive invariantism rely on a principle of charity in the interpretation of epistemic claims, neither approach satisfies charity...
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Epistemic contextualists think that the extension of the expression ‘knows’ (and its cognates) depends on and varies with the context of utterance. In the last 15 years or so this view has faced intense criticism. This paper focuses on two sorts of objections. The first are what I call the ‘linguistic objections’, which purport to show that the best available linguistic evidence suggests that ‘...
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This paper reviews the use of speech act theory in AI natural language systems, arguing that attempts to embody speech acts as simple STRIPS-like operators are doomed to failure. The diiculties arise partly from the fact that there is no reliable way of associating speech acts and surface forms, and partly from properties of epistemic logic. 1 Background The aim of the current paper is to serve...
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It has been argued that epistemic contextualism faces the so-called factivity problem and hence cannot be stated properly. The basic idea behind this charge is that contextualists supposedly have to say, on the one hand, that knowledge ascribing sentences like “S knows that S has hands” are true when used in ordinary contexts while, on the other hand, they are not true by the standard of their ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Philosophical Review
سال: 2009
ISSN: 0031-8108,1558-1470
DOI: 10.1215/00318108-2009-026