Epistemic Injustice in Brain Studies of (Trans)Gender Identity

Epistemic injustice in psychiatry

It has been argued that those who suffer from medical conditions are more vulnerable to epistemic injustice (a harm done to a person in their capacity as an epistemic subject) than healthy people. This editorial claims that people with mental disorders are even more vulnerable to epistemic injustice than those with somatic illnesses. Two kinds of contributory factors are outlined, global and sp...

Epistemic Injustice and Illness

This article analyses the phenomenon of epistemic injustice within contemporary healthcare. We begin by detailing the persistent complaints patients make about their testimonial frustration and hermeneutical marginalization, and the negative impact this has on their care. We offer an epistemic analysis of this problem using Miranda Fricker's account of epistemic injustice. We detail two types o...

The Nature of Epistemic Injustice

Identity in epistemic semantics

This paper is a contribution to the semantical theory of different types of knowledge ascription, in particular the semantics of ‘knowing who’ and of the interaction between quantifiers and epistemic modal expressions. In possible world semantics, the truth conditions of such sentences depend on the way that identity across possible worlds is modeled. The main argument of this paper is that the...

Epistemic injustice and the mental health service user.

John Rawles (2004, p. 230) famously asserted that ‘Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought’. Truth and justice, he argued, are not to be compromised, and laws and institutions must be abolished or reformed if found to be unjust. Nevertheless, justice tends not to be the first principle of appeal or consideration in ethical deliberations in mental he...