Epidemic population games and evolutionary dynamics

Population Games And Evolutionary Dynamics

Population Games and Deterministic Evolutionary Dynamics

Population games describe strategic interactions among large numbers of small, anonymous agents. Behavior in these games is typically modeled dynamically, with agents occasionally receiving opportunities to switch strategies, basing their choices on simple myopic rules called revision protocols. Over finite time spans the evolution of aggregate behavior is well approximated by the solution of a...

Technical supplement to “Population Games and Deterministic Evolutionary Dynamics”

After 3.3: Ordinary differential equations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Before 5.1.3: Extinction and invariance under imitative dynamics . . . . . . . . . 3 With 5.1.3: Monotone percentage growth rates and positive correlation . . . . . . 3 With 5.1.3: Rest points and restricted equilibria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 With 5.2.2: Construction of solutions of the be...

Stable Population Games and Integrability for Evolutionary Dynamics∗

We introduce a new class of population games called stable games. These games are characterized by self-defeating externalities: when agents revise their strategies, the improvements in the payoffs of strategies to which revising agents are switching are always exceeded by the improvements in the payoffs of strategies which revising agents are abandoning. Stable games subsume many well-known cl...

Evolutionary Games and Local Dynamics

Evolutionary games have been introduced by Maynard Smith and Price [1973] in the early 70’s with the aim to study the stability of populations in time. In the general model, a population consists of finitely many different types that interact randomly with each other, where each interaction leads to fitness payoffs for each of the types involved. Consequently, the population distribution over t...