Environmental Uncertainty, Managerial Ability and Tax Aggressiveness
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Shareholder Investment Horizons and Tax Aggressiveness
This paper examines whether the investment horizon of a firm’s institutional shareholders affects the extent of tax aggressiveness as proxied by a firm’s five-year cash effective tax rate and yearly permanent book-tax differences. Using a sample of firms with institutional ownership data from 1995-2008, we find more tax aggressiveness for firms held by short-term investors and less tax aggressi...
متن کاملWhat Does Tax Aggressiveness Signal? Evidence from Stock Price Reactions to News About Tax Aggressiveness
We study the stock price reaction to news about tax aggressiveness. We find that, on average, a company’s stock price declines when there is news about its involvement in tax shelters. The stock price decline is smaller for companies with relatively high effective tax rates, possibly because news about tax aggressiveness is more favorably viewed for those firms where public information would su...
متن کاملManagerial Ability and Earnings Management
We investigate how managerial ability affects the intentional distortion of financial statements (earnings management). On the one hand, better managers receive a compensation premium for their perceived ability, and to the extent that earnings management would tarnish their reputations, we expect them to manage earnings less. On the other hand, better managers may be more able to extract rents...
متن کاملAre female CFOs less tax aggressive? Evidence from tax aggressiveness
This paper investigates the effect of CFO gender on corporate tax aggressiveness. Focusing on firms that experience a male-to-female CFO transition, the paper compares those firms’ degree of tax aggressiveness during the preand posttransition periods. Using the probability of tax sheltering, the predicted unrecognized tax benefits, and the discretionary permanent book-tax differences to measure...
متن کاملUncertainty , Investment , and Managerial Incentives ∗
This study provides evidence that managerial incentives, shaped by compensation contracts, help to explain the empirical relationship between uncertainty and investment. We develop a model in which the manager, induced by an incentive contract, makes investment decisions for a firm that faces time-varying volatility. In the model, a manager’s privately optimal investment response to a volatilit...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Jurnal AKSI (Akuntansi dan Sistem Informasi)
سال: 2020
ISSN: 2541-3198,2528-6145
DOI: 10.32486/aksi.v5i1.474