Environmental Risk Insurance under Dynamic Moral Hazard
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Environmental Risk Insurance under Dynamic Moral Hazard∗
A firm is subject to accident risk, which the manager can mitigate by exerting effort. An agency problem arises because effort is unobservable and the manager has limited liability. The occurrence of accidents is modelled as a Poisson process, whose intensity is controlled by the manager. We use martingale techniques to formulate the manager’s incentive compatibility constraints. The optimal co...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2007
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.966213