Environmental Regulation, Comparative Advantage and the Porter Hypothesis
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Stringency of Environmental Regulation and the 'porter Hypothesis' the Stringency of Environmental Regulation and the 'porter Hypothesis'
Most empirical evidence indicates that the costs of environmental regulation represent a minor fraction of total production costs. This finding is at odds with the assumption of stringent environmental regulation of both propo-nents and opponents of the 'Porter Hypothesis'. A possible explanation may be provided by examining the nego-tiation of environmental regulation in a 'political market'. ...
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The purpose of this paper is to suggest a procedure to empirically test the Porter hypothesis. This hypothesis argues that environmental regulation not only increases environmental quality, but also brings the polluting producers information that makes them more resource efficient, as well as able to develop new technologies. Specifically, the hypothesis tested is whether there is a positive si...
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Strategic quality competition and the Porter Hypothesis
This paper offers new support for the Porter Hypothesis within the context of a quality competition framework. We use a duopoly model of vertical product differentiation in which two firms simultaneously choose to produce either a high (environmentally friendly) quality or low (standard) quality variant of a good, before engaging in price competition. In this simple setting, we show that a Nash...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 1998
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.135608