Environmental Innovation under Cournot Competition

Cournot Competition under Uncertainty∗

We analyze Cournot competition under demand uncertainty. We show that under rather general assumptions, the game has no asymmetric equilibria but multiple symmetric equilibria. Multiplicity is caused by the requirement of nonnegative prices and remains an issue also for simple demand specifications, such as the linear case. We then show that uniqueness of equilibrium is guaranteed if uncertaint...

Welfare losses under Cournot competition

In a market for a homogeneous good where firms are identical, compete in quantities and produce with constant returns, the percentage of welfare losses (PWL) is small with as few as five competitors for a class of demand functions which includes linear and isoelastic cases. We study markets with positive fixed costs and asymmetric firms. We provide exact formulae of PWL and robust constructions...

R&D subsidies under asymmetric Cournot competition

Endogenous fluctuations under evolutionary pressure in Cournot competition

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Network Cournot Competition

Cournot competition, introduced in 1838 by Antoine Augustin Cournot, is a fundamental economic model that represents firms competing in a single market of a homogeneous good. Each firm tries to maximize its utility—naturally a function of the production cost as well as market price of the product—by deciding on the amount of production. This problem has been studied comprehensively in Economics...