Environmental Agreements – a New Instrument of Environmental Policy
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Environmental Policy and Law
سال: 1997
ISSN: 0378-777X,1878-5395
DOI: 10.3233/epl-1997-27406