Entry Threats and Inefficiency in ‘Efficient Bargaining’
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Free entry and social inefficiency
Previous articles have noted the possibility of socially ineficient levels of entry in markets in whichJirms must incurjixed set-up costs upon entry. This article identijies thefundamental and intuitive forces that lie behind these entry biases. Ifan entrant causes incumbentJirms to reduce output, entry is more desirable to the entrant than it is to society. There is therefore a tendency toward...
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We study wage bargaining in which the union is uncertain about the firm's willingness to pay and threat payoffs vary over time. Strike payoffs change over time as replacement workers are hired, as strikers find temporary jobs, and as inventories or strike funds run out. We find that bargaining outcomes are substantially altered if threat payoffs vary. If dispute costs increase in the long-run, ...
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We investigate the social desirability of free entry in the co-opetition model in which firms compete in a homogeneous product market while sharing common property resources that affect market size or consumers’ willingness to pay for products. We show that free entry leads to socially excessive or insufficient entry into the market in the case of non-commitment co-opetition, depending on the m...
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In most existing models of bargaining it is assumed that traders know how much they value the object they are bargaining over. However, we observe in practice that economic agents often dedicate time and resources into learning the characteristics of goods and services they are considering to trade. For instance, imagine a consulting firm pitching a project to a potential customer. While the de...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Scottish Journal of Political Economy
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0036-9292
DOI: 10.1111/sjpe.12091