Entry, stackelberg equilibrium and reasonable conjectures
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Entry, Stackelberg Equilibrium and Reasonable Conjectures*
This paper deals with the problem of entry deterrence in two different ways. First, we analyze conditions under which entry prevention is the best strategy for an incumbent firm, and second, we link entry prevention with another important field of industrial organization, the analysis of reasonable conjectures. That entry prevention may be of interest for incumbent firms has been studied by Osb...
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The classical Wardropian principle assumes that users minimize either individual travel cost or overall system cost. Unlike the pure Wardropian equilibrium, there might be in reality both competition and cooperation among users, typically when there exist oligopoly Cournot-Nash (CN) firms. In this paper, we first formulate a mixed behavior network equilibrium model as variational inequalities (...
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Cooper (1986) examined the equilibrium of the retroactive most-favored-customer pricing policy by using a two-period duopoly model. He showed that the most-favoredcustomer policy enables both firms to offer higher prices and to enjoy higher profits. Neilson and Winter (1992) showed that even if one firm in a price-setting duopoly adopts the most-favored-customer policy, the equilibrium does not...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Industrial Organization
سال: 1988
ISSN: 0167-7187
DOI: 10.1016/s0167-7187(88)80007-9