Entry Regulation under Asymmetric Information about Demand
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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This paper studies the e®ect of technology spillovers on the entry decision of a multinational enterprise into a foreign market. Two alternative entry modes for a foreign direct investment are considered: Green ̄eld investment versus acquisition. We ̄nd that with quantity competition a spillover makes acquisitions less attractive, while with price competition acquisitions become more attractive....
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economics Research International
سال: 2010
ISSN: 2090-2123,2090-2131
DOI: 10.1155/2010/105049