Entrepreneurs’ Education and Different Variable Pay Schemes in Italian Firms

Entrepreneurs, Risk Aversion and Dynamic Firms

This paper conducts a theoretical and quantitative analysis of how entrepreneurs choose firm size, capital structure, default, and owner consumption to manage firm risk, including how these choices change with risk aversion. We decompose an entrepreneur’s default decision into three elements: the fraction of firm debt; the potential reduction in personal consumption from losing the firm; and th...

Entrepreneurs , Firms and Global Wealth since 1850

Firms' Compliance of Emissions Regulations under different Penalty Schemes

We present preliminary results of a series of laboratory experiments performed to test hypotheses on compliance behaviour of firms under different enforcement regimes in a program that caps aggregate emissions of a given pollutant. The enforcement design for the laboratory experiments considers inducing individual perfect compliance and also allow for violations, under both emissions standards ...

What Do Entrepreneurs Pay for Venture Capital Affiliation?

This study empirically evaluates the certification and value-added roles of reputable venture capitalists (VCs). Using a novel sample of entrepreneurial start-ups with multiple financing offers, I analyze financing offers made by competing VCs at the first professional round of start-up funding, holding characteristics of the start-up fixed. Offers made by VCs with a high reputation are three t...

S-shaped Incentive Schemes and Pay Caps

S-shaped incentive schemes and pay caps are fairly common in practice. This paper demonstrates the optimality of s-shaped incentive schemes and pay caps by incorporating salespeople’s aversion to pay inequity into the standard agency model. Our analysis shows that salespeople’s desire for pay fairness increases the convexity of the optimal incentive scheme at small sales but increases the conca...