Enforcing Cooperation Among Medieval Merchants: The Maghribi Traders Revisited
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Analysing the Apprenticeship System in the Maghribi Traders Coalition
In this work we further the investigation into the functioning of the Maghribi Traders Coalition – a historically significant traders collective that operated along the North African coast between the 10th and 13th centuries. They acted as a closed group whose interactions were governed by informal institutions (i.e. norms). Historical accounts point to an apprenticeship system that was in forc...
متن کاملContract enforcement, institutions, and social capital: the Maghribi traders reappraised1
Social scientists draw important lessons for modern development from the medieval Maghribi traders who, it has been argued, lacked effective legal mechanisms for contract enforcement and instead relied on informal sanctions based on collective ostracism within an exclusive coalition. We show that this claim is untenable. Not a single empirical example adduced as evidence of the putative coaliti...
متن کاملCooperation Policies for Traders
[NiGo94] Y. Ni and A. Goscinski. Trader cooperation to enable object sharing among users of homogeneous distributed systems. been described in section 3 are applied. This means answering the questions of the introduction either by the system administrator or automatically. In a next step, cost and security aspects will be included. To prepare this, cost have already been included in the general...
متن کاملEnforcing Cooperation in Networked Societies
Which social norms and networks maximize cooperation in bilateral relationships? We study a network of players in which each link is a repeated bilateral partnership with two-sided moral hazard. The obstacle to community enforcement is that each player observes the behavior of her partners in their partnerships with her, but not how they behave in other partnerships. We introduce a new metric f...
متن کاملSelf-Enforcing Cooperation with Graduated Punishments∗
Case studies of self-enforcing cooperation in repeated interactions usually find that the punishments inflicted on deviators are mild to start with, and increase only if there is evidence of persistent deviation. We model this using a combination of imperfect monitoring and asymmetric information in a one-sided prisoner’s dilemma. Call the player with the temptation to cheat player B, and the o...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2006
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.958617