Enforcement, Managerial Discretion, and the Informativeness of Accruals
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: European Accounting Review
سال: 2020
ISSN: 0963-8180,1468-4497
DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2020.1771393