Endogenous Shifts in OPEC Market Power: A Stackelberg Oligopoly with Fringe
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Endogenous Shifts in OPEC Market Power – A Stackelberg Oligopoly with Fringe
This article proposes a two-stage oligopoly model for the crude oil market. In a game of several Stackelberg leaders, market power increases endogenously as the spare capacity of the competitive fringe goes down. This effect is due to the specific cost function characteristics of extractive industries. The model captures the increase of OPEC market power before the financial crisis and its dras...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2013
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2304129