Endogenous policy leads to inefficient risk sharing
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Risk - Sharing and Endogenous Network Formation 1
In much of the economic literature an insurance network is treated as an exogenous institution. Frequently, the assumption is made that all households who are member of an easily identifiable group (e.g. the village, the extended family, etc.) form one single network. There are, however, both theoretical and empirical grounds for being sceptical about this approach. Bala and Goyal (2000) theore...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Review of Economic Dynamics
سال: 2004
ISSN: 1094-2025
DOI: 10.1016/j.red.2003.12.001