Endogenous Insurance and Informal Relationships
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Endogenous insurance and informal relationships
Heterogeneously risk-averse individuals who lack access to formal insurance build and use relationships with each other to manage risk. I show that the composition of equilibrium relationships under pairwise matching and when group size is endogenous is determined by a mean-variance trade-o¤ across di¤erentially risky productive opportunities, though output distributions may have in nitely-many...
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A rich literature seeks to explain the distinctive features of equilibrium institutions arising in risky environments which lack formal insurance and credit markets. I develop a theory of endogenous matching between heterogeneously risk-averse individuals who, once matched, choose both the riskiness of the income stream they face (ex ante risk management) as well as how to share that risk (ex p...
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Households in developing countries use a variety of informal mechanisms to cope with risk, including mutual support and risk-sharing. These mechanisms cannot avoid that they remain vulnerable to shocks. Public programs in the form of food aid distribution and food-for-work programs are meant to protect vulnerable households from consumption and nutrition downturns by providing a safety net. In ...
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Today, most of the big cities or metropolises around the world have been encountering with the problem of informal habitation. The present study, thus, tries to focus on the role of endogenous development in such type of habitation process. For that matter, the paper takes into account architectural programming and urbanism as its theoretical framework because the endogenous development is rela...
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This paper studies bilateral insurance schemes across networks of individuals. While transfers are based on social norms, each individual must have the incentive to abide by those norms, and so we investigate the structure of self-enforcing insurance networks. Network links play two distinct and possibly conflictual roles. First, they act as conduits for transfers. Second, they act as conduits ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2013
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2295724