Endogenous Growth and Equilibrium Unemployment in a North-South Model
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Review of Development Economics
سال: 2002
ISSN: 1363-6669,1467-9361
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9361.00137