Endogenous Depth of Reasoning
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Endogenous Depth of Reasoning∗
We introduce a model of strategic thinking in games of initial response. Unlike standard models of strategic thinking, in this framework the player’s ‘depth of reasoning’ is endogenously determined, and it can be disentangled from his beliefs over his opponent’s cognitive bound. In our approach, individuals act as if they follow a cost-benefit analysis. The depth of reasoning is a function of t...
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We extend Alaoui and Pentas (2015, 2016a,b) model of Endogenous Depth of Reasoning to account for Response Time, and apply it to generate predictions for Avoyan and Schotters (2015) attention allocation task. We show that all the experimental ndings of Avoyan and Schotter are consistent with this model.
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Reasoning about perception of depth and about spatial relations between moving physical objects is a challenging problem. We investigate the representation of depth and motion by means of depth profiles whereby each object in the world is represented as a single peak. We propose a logical theory, formulated in the situation calculus (SC), that is used for reasoning about object motion (includin...
متن کاملDepth of strategic reasoning in games.
Orthodox game theory assumes indefinitely recursive reasoning ('I think that you think that I think em leader '), but human decision-makers, who are limited by bounded rationality, cannot handle limitless layers of complexity. Recent research corroborates earlier findings that human players tend to operate at only one or two levels of strategic depth.
متن کاملFinite Depth of Reasoning and Equilibrium Play
The standard framework for analyzing games with incomplete information models players as if they have an infinite depth of reasoning. This paper generalizes the type spaces of Harsanyi (1967–1968) so that players can have a finite depth of reasoning. We do this by restricting the set of events that a player of a finite depth can reason about. This allows us to extend the Bayesian-Nash equilibri...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Review of Economic Studies
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0034-6527,1467-937X
DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdv052