Endogenous cartel formation with heterogeneous firms
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Endogenous Cartel Formation with Heterogeneous Firms∗
In the context of an infinitely repeated capacity-constrained price game, we endogenize the composition of a cartel when firms are heterogeneous in their capacities. When firms are sufficiently patient, there exists a stable cartel involving the largest firms. A firm with sufficiently small capacity is not a member of any stable cartel. When a cartel is not all-inclusive, colluding firms set a ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The RAND Journal of Economics
سال: 2010
ISSN: 0741-6261,1756-2171
DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2009.00091.x