Endogenous and costly institutional deterrence

Endogenous Costly Communication and Equilibrium Selection

We examine the effects of communication in a simple coordination game with two Pareto-ranked equilibria in pure strategies. Past research demonstrates that efficient coordination is difficult when communication is not allowed but that costless pre-play communication (cheap talk) can reliably produce coordination on the efficient equilibrium. We introduce two realistic features of communication ...

Cartel Criminalization in Europe: Addressing Deterrence and Institutional Challenges

This Article analyzes cartel criminalization in Europe from a deterrence and institutional perspective. First, it investigates the idea of criminalization by putting it in perspective with the more general question of what types of sanctions a jurisdiction might adopt against collusive behavior. Second, it analyzes the institutional element of criminalization by (1) discussing the compatibility...

Endogenous dynamics of institutional change

A parsimonious set of mechanisms explains how and under which conditions behavioral deviations build into cascades that reshape institutional frameworks from the bottom up, even if institutional innovations initially conflict with the legally codified rules of the game. Specifically, we argue that this type of endogenous institutional change emerges from an interplay between three factors: the ...

Endogenous Institutional Change and Dynamic Capitalism

Endogenous Institutional Change and Capitalism in China