Employer Learning and Statistical Discrimination
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Bayesian Bigot? Statistical Discrimination, Stereotypes, and Employer Decision Making.
Much of the debate over the underlying causes of discrimination centers on the rationality of employer decision making. Economic models of statistical discrimination emphasize the cognitive utility of group estimates as a means of dealing with the problems of uncertainty. Sociological and social-psychological models, by contrast, question the accuracy of group-level attributions. Although mean ...
متن کاملStatistical Discrimination, Employer Learning, and Employment Di¤erentials by Race, Gender, and Education
Previous papers on testing for statistical discrimination and employer learning require variables that employers do not observe directly, but are observed by researchers or data on employer-provided performance measures. This paper develops a test that does not rely on these speci c variables. The proposed test can be performed with individual-level cross-section data on employment status, expe...
متن کاملA Test of Screening Discrimination with Employer Learning
This paper tests for the presence of screening discrimination, a type of statistical discrimination that occurs when employers are less able to evaluate the ability of workers from one group than from another. Using data from the 2000 release of the NLSY79, the author examines wage equations in a framework of employer learning to test the hypothesis that the market receives less reliable produc...
متن کاملStatistical Discrimination and Efficiency
This paper asks whether statistical discrimination is a market failure. I consider the problem for a utilitarian social planner who operates in an environment that can generate statistical discrimination as an equilibrium phenomenon. It is found that there are potential efficiency gains from discrimination in terms of reduced “mismatch” between workers and jobs. Whether the solution to the plan...
متن کاملEmployer Learning and General Human Capital∗
We develop a model where competing employers gradually learn about a worker’s productivity, like in the standard Jovanovic (1979) learning model. Rather than assuming that productivity is match-specific, we allow for general human capital productivity. We consider competitive wage determination through matching wage offers and counter-offers. We can also characterize the wage dynamics. Some of ...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Quarterly Journal of Economics
سال: 2001
ISSN: 0033-5533,1531-4650
DOI: 10.1162/003355301556329