Empirical implementation of nonparametric first-price auction models
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Integrated-quantile-based Estimation for First-price Auction Models
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Econometrics
سال: 2012
ISSN: 0304-4076
DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconom.2011.09.008