Eliciting Second-Order Beliefs

A Mechanism for Eliciting Second-Order Beliefs and the Inclination to Choose

This paper describes a direct revelation mechanism for eliciting decision makers’ introspective beliefs on sets of subjective prior or posterior probabilities. The proposed scheme constitutes a revealedpreference procedure for measuring the inclination of decision makers to choose one alternative over another modeled by Minardi and Savochkin (2015).

Second-order false-beliefs, language and logic

On eliciting beliefs in strategic games

Several recent studies in experimental economics have tried to measure beliefs of subjects engaged in strategic games with other subjects. Using data from one such study we conduct an experiment where our experienced subjects observe early rounds of strategy choices from that study and are given monetary incentives to report forecasts of choices in later rounds. We elicit beliefs using three di...

Eliciting Ambiguous Beliefs Under α-Maxmin Preference

We study the problem of elicitation of subjective beliefs of an agent when the beliefs are ambiguous (the set of beliefs is a non-singleton set) and the agent’s preference exhibits ambiguity aversion; in particular, as represented by α-maxmin preferences. We construct a direct revelation mechanism such that truthful reporting of beliefs is the agent’s unique best response. The mechanism uses kn...

Eliciting interval beliefs: An experimental study

In this paper we study the interval scoring rule as a mechanism to elicit subjective beliefs under varying degrees of uncertainty. In our experiment, subjects forecast the termination time of a time series to be generated from a given but unknown stochastic process. Subjects gradually learn more about the underlying process over time and hence the true distribution over termination times. We co...