Elicitation using multiple price list formats
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
List construction and lottery presentation modulate multiple price list responses
Multiple price list (MPL) elicitation of risk preferences is familiar through the Holt & Laury (2002) procedure. We assess the impact of varying list order and spacing, and the presentation via text and/or graphics. Some nonlinear transformations of lottery prices systematically increase elicited risk aversion, and graphical displays tend to reduce it, relative to the original MPL.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Experimental Economics
سال: 2008
ISSN: 1386-4157,1573-6938
DOI: 10.1007/s10683-008-9204-6